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Abstract
Labor courts may introduce a signifi cant wedge between “legal” fi ring costs and “effective” 
(post-trial) fi ring costs. Apart from procedural costs, there is uncertainty over judges’ 
rulings, in particular over the likelihood of a “fair” dismissal ultimately being ruled as “unfair”, 
which may increase fi ring costs signifi cantly. In 2010 and 2012, reforms of Employment 
Protection Legislation widened the defi nition of fair economic dismissals in Spain. In this 
paper we look at Labor Court rulings on dismissals across Spanish provinces before and 
after the EPL reforms (2004-2014). We make this comparison taking into account a set 
of co-variates (local labor market conditions, characteristics of the Labor Courts, pre-trial 
conciliations, congestion of Labor Courts) which may determine the selection of dismissal 
cases ruled by Labor Courts. Our results suggest that, despite the 2010 and 2012 EPL 
reforms, the proportion of economic redundancies being ruled as fair by Labor Courts has 
not substantially increased, although it is now less negatively associated with the local 
unemployment rate than in the pre-reform period.
Keywords: employment protection legislation, fi ring costs, unemployment.
JEL classifi cation: J52, J53, K31, K41.
Resumen
La intervención de los juzgados de lo Social en casos de despido da lugar a que pueda 
existir una diferencia importante entre las indemnizaciones por despido establecidas por 
la ley y los costes efectivos de despido (después de su resolución). Además de los costes 
asociados al procedimiento judicial, están los derivados de la incertidumbre sobre el sentido 
de la sentencia, que puede declarar el despido improcedente, lo que implica una subida 
sustancial de las indemnizaciones. En 2010 y 2012 sendas reformas laborales ampliaron 
la defi nición de despido objetivo procedente en España. En este artículo se usan datos 
provinciales sobre sentencias judiciales en casos de despido referidos a períodos anteriores 
y posteriores a la reforma (2004-2014). En este análisis se tienen en cuenta algunas 
características provinciales (las condiciones locales del mercado de trabajo, características 
de los juzgados de lo Social, la prevalencia de conciliaciones judiciales, la congestión judicial) 
que pueden infl uir en la selección de casos de despido que acaban siendo resueltos por 
sentencia judicial. Los resultados indican que, a pesar de las reformas de 2010 y 2012, la 
proporción de despidos que son declarados procedentes por los juzgados de lo Social no 
ha aumentado signifi cativamente, aunque ahora muestra una asociación negativa con la 
tasa de paro local menor que en el periodo anterior a las reformas.
Palabras clave: legislación sobre protección al empleo, costes de despido, desempleo.
Códigos JEL: J52, J53, K31, K41.
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1 Introduction
In most countries Employment Protection Legislation (EPL, henceforth) im-
poses that workers dismissals must have a "fair cause".1 Additionally, EPL
typically distinguishes between economic redundancies and disciplinary layo?s,
and imposes di?erent legal procedures and severance payments depending on
the cause of the dismissal. Even in those countries where EPL (or lack of it) fol-
lows the doctrine of "employment at will" (as it is the case, for instance, in the
US), common-law restrictions that limit employers ability to ?re are becoming
more and more prevalent (see Autor et al., 2004).
Labor Courts’ intervention in the resolution of dismissals introduces a sig-
ni?cant wedge between "legal" ?ring costs (i.e., those established by EPL) and
"e?ective" ?ring costs (i.e., those that employers actually have to cope with dur-
ing and after Labor Courts’ intervention).2 A part of this wedge is the cost aris-
ing from complex/time-consuming legal procedures; another part comes from
the uncertainty about judges’ rulings and the possibility that "fair" dismissals,
from the employers’ interpretation of EPL regulations, are ?nally ruled out as
"unfair" by Labor Courts.
In principle, uncertainty on Labor Courts rulings could be reduced by EPL
stipulating clearly the conditions under which redundancies and layo?s are jus-
ti?ed. However, whether judges are neutral and unbiased agents with no dis-
cretion in their rulings over mandated legislation, and, hence, whether their
rulings are based solely on laws and facts, are controversial issues.3 As for La-
bor Courts, there is wide empirical evidence showing that judges do seem to
exploit some degree of discretion, and that, in some instances, they act under a
kind of "social motivation". For instance, in Italy there is some association be-
tween local labor market conditions, such as the unemployment rate, and labor
courts’ decisions (Macis, 2001, Ichino et al., 2004); in Germany, even after con-
trolling for the fact that court activity varies systematically with the political
leaning of the government that appoints judges, there is a signi?cant positive
relation between labor court activity and unemployment (Berger and Neugart,
2011); and, in the UK unemployment and ?rms’ bankruptcy rates seem also
to be statistically associated to the probability of judges deciding in favor of
dismissed employees in unfair dismissal trials (Marinescu, 2011).
In those countries where EPL is stricter, the gap between ?ring costs of fair
1All OECD countries, with the exception of the United States, require that dismissals
should be justi?ed in some way in addition to prohibiting discriminatory dismissals on a wide
range of grounds. The ILO’s Convention 158 on Termination of Employment, which Spain
rati?ed in 1985, states that “The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there
is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker
or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service”.
2OECD (2013), chapter 2, provides a descriptive analysis of how labor courts intervene
in workers’ dismissal cases in several countries. Within OECD coutries, Spain and Portugal,
together with Turkey and Chile, are the countries in which dismissal cases are under the
jurisdiction of only professional judges in Labor Courts.
3 See Bornstein and Miller(2009), Posner (2010), Muñoz Aranguren (2011), and Danziger
et al. (2011). In the Annex we give some information on the "potential social motivation" of
Spanish judges acting in the labor jurisdiction.
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and unfair dismissals is larger, which makes Labor Courts’ intervention more
critical to the determination of "e?ective" ?ring costs. Moreover, the decisive
role of Labor Courts at determining ?ring costs creates room for strategic be-
havior by employers and dismissed employees in the initiation and resolution of
dismissals. Most EPL reforms aimed at reducing ?ring costs typically focus on
decreasing ?ring costs and severance payments for "unfair" dismissals, which
has some controversial normative implications, as it builds down to making less
costly what is, from a social point of view, "unfair". An alternative reform strat-
egy is to rede?ne the "fair causes" for dismissals, assuming that Labor Courts
will change their rulings accordingly. Whether this assumption should be taken
for granted is also controversial.
In this paper we analyze the impact of recent EPL reforms in Spain that
widened the de?nition of "fair" causes for economic redundancies. Since data on
individual cases are not available, we look at the proportion of fair dismissals
as ruled by Labor Courts across Spanish provinces before-and-after the EPL
reforms. We perform this comparison taking into account a set of co-variates
(local labor market conditions, characteristics of the Labor Courts, pre-trial
conciliations, congestion of Labor Courts) which may determine the selection
of dismissal cases ruled by Labor Courts and, hence, alter their rulings for
reasons other than the extension of fair causes of economic redundancies. Since
our variable of interest (the proportion of fair dismissals as ruled by Labor
Courts) shows a positive correlation with the local unemployment rate, we also
look at the change in that correlation before-and-after the reform. Thus, our
identi?cation assumption relies on the control for observed heterogeneity in
the composition of dismissal cases solved by Labor Courts across provinces,
on the assumption that other e?ects of the reforms, besides the widening of the
de?nition of economic redundancies, and changes in labor market conditions
a?ected Labor Court rulings only through this set of co-variates. Thus, we
regress the proportion of dismissals being ruled out as fair by Labor Court across
provinces and across time on a time dummy variable and the set of co-variates
described above. We read the e?ects of the extension of fair causes of economic
redundancies on Labor Court rulings from the coe?cients of the time dummy
and its interaction with the local unemployment rate. Our interpretation of
the results is that the extension of fair causes of economic redundancies only
decreased the negative association between rulings declaring dismissals fair and
the local unemployment rate.
The paper is organized in four more sections. First, we describe the partic-
ular features of Spanish EPL and its reforms in 2010 and 2012, with a speci?c
focus in changes regarding the causes for dismissals (Section 2). Secondly, we
lay o? a theoretical model of ?rms’ ?ring decisions under uncertainty of La-
bor Court rulings, to identify the main channels through which the widening of
fair causes for economic dismissals could change the selection of dismissal cases
brought to Labour Courts and its impact on "e?ective" ?ring costs of economic
redundancies (Section 3). Our data analysis is presented in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
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2 EPL in Spain: "Fair" and "Unfair" Firings
Before 2010 Spain was among the countries where EPL for regular workers was
thought to be stricter. Spanish legislators, facing a perceived political infeasi-
bility of reducing EPL under regular employment contracts, introduced employ-
ment ?exibility at the margin by creating a wide array of "atypical" contracts,
consolidating the dual nature of Spanish EPL.4 While regular employees are en-
titled the right to go to court to appeal the cause of the dismissal, and may get
higher severance payments in case of unfair dismissals (see Figure 1 for a gen-
eral outline of the layo? procedures), temporary employees cannot appeal the
termination of their contracts. Thus, employers use ?xed-term and other kind
of temporary contracts (nowadays amounting to about 25% of employment) to
bu?er against negative shocks leading to downsizing of their labor force.5
In a nutshell and before the recent reforms, EPL for regular employees was
based on the following principles:
• Dismissals were considered to be justi?ed only in very restrictive cases, and
only as a measure of "last resource". As for economic redundancies, they
were considered "fair" only when there were negative economic situations
for the company, or technical, organizational or production problems that
put on compromise the viability of the company, and, moreover, no other
measures could restore the economic viability of the ?rm. There were
no speci?c provisions clarifying what "negative conditions" meant, so the
ambiguity of the de?nition and the additional condition about the lack of
other solutions, gave judges a great deal of discretion. As for disciplinary
layo?s, the legislation referred to misconduct or lack of adaptation of the
employee to the job’s task as the main justi?ed causes.
• The employer had the burden of proof that the ?ring was justi?ed, both
under economic and disciplinary causes.
• Judges must apply the interpretive principle "in dubio pro operario", ac-
cording to which, in case of doubt they ought to rule in favor of the
dismissed employee.
• As for severance payments, employees on permanent contracts who were
dismissed for “fair” economic reasons were entitled to a severance pay
of 20 days’ wages per year of seniority, with a maximum of 12 months’
wages. Employees dismissed for disciplinary reasons with a "fair" ruling
were entitled to no severance pay and no interim wages.
• Dismissed employees could appeal to a labor court and, if the dismissal
was ruled out to be “unfair”, ?rms either had to pay 45 days’ wages per
year of seniority with a maximum of 42 months’ wages or to reinstate the
4See Bentolila et al. (2012). There is and extensive literature documenting the negative
e?ects of dualism in the Spanish labor market (among others, García-Serrano, 1998, Bentolila
and Dolado 1994, Bentolila et al., 2008, and Wöl? and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2012).
5 See Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1507
worker, regardless of the alleged cause. From 1996, there was a second-
tier of permanent contracts targeted at some population groups, under
which the severance pay in case of unfair dismissals was 33 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a maximum of 24 months’ wages. Up to 20026
in case of unfair dismissals the ?rm was also obliged to pay wages cor-
responding to the period between the date of the dismissal and the date
of the court ruling. Starting in 2003 the payment corresponding to the
interim wages could be waived if the ?rm accepted that the dismissal was
unfair upon dismissal. From this date onwards, most ?rms accepted to
pay the severance pay for unfair dismissal up-front, and avoid a Labor
Court intervention that could impose the payment of interim wages.
• Moreover, Labor Courts could also declare the dismissal "null", if they
appreciated "discrimination" (a violation of the fundamental rights of the
employee) or breach of union rights as the real motivation for the dismissal.
In this case, the dismissed employee ought to be reinstated and interim
wages paid. However, these circumstances were rather infrequent.7
Since the legal procedures for disciplinary layo?s were simpler, and severance
pay in case of unfair dismissal was the same than under economic redundan-
cies, employers most frequently initiated dismissals alleging disciplinary causes.
During the 1984-2010 period, about 70% of dismissal cases resolved by Labor
Courts’ rulings were declared "unfair", with only a few of them being declared
"null".
Since September 2010 there have been two signi?cant EPL reforms in Spain,
together with modi?cations of collective bargaining legislation, and some other
measures addressed to reduce youth unemployment and increase the e?ective-
ness of intermediation by public employment services.8 As for EPL, the most
relevant legal changes were the following:
• The conditions under which a dismissal for economic reasons is considered
to be fair were signi?cantly extended, including the incidence of current or
anticipated losses, and a persistent decline in the ?rm’s level of revenues
that could a?ect to its economic viability or its ability to maintain its level
of employment.
• Moreover, the employer no longer has to provide an objective proof that
dismissal was the only measure to restore the economic viability of the
?rm, but some evidence that the dismissal decision was needed to preserve
the ?rm’s current or future competitive position.
• The 2010 reform reversed the burden of proof, so that it is now on the
employees when they claim that the dismissal was unfair.
6Law 45/2002 in e?ect since December 14, 2002.
7For further evidence, see Palomo Balda (2013).
8Labor Reform Law of 2010, the Royal Decree-Law of 2011 and the Labor Reform Law of
2012
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• The labor market reform of 2012 made further progress on the clari?ca-
tion of what "negative economic causes" meant. Thus, after this date a
dismissal is to be considered "fair" if "the level of revenue or sales of the
company was lower than in the same quarter of the previous year". Fur-
thermore, interim wages in case of "unfair" dismissals were eliminated de
facto, even if the employer opted for the reinstatement of the dismissed
employee. That is, employers can now wait until the labor court ruling
and, in case of a unfavorable one to their interests, the may reinstate dis-
missed employees without them receiving any severance pay nor interim
wages.
As stated in the general outline (see Figure 1), both before and after the
reforms a conciliation stage ("out-of-court conciliation") prior to the labor court
ruling is compulsory. As shown below, a large number of con?icts are settled in
this stage, a?ecting to the selection of cases solved by Labor Courts’ rulings.
It is conceivable that the EPL reforms of 2010 and 2012 ought to increase
the proportion of economic redundancies being ruled out as fair by the Labor
Courts. It is also conceivable that the reforms lead to an increase in litigation,
as employers may have now lower incentives to negotiate with dismissed employ-
ees,9 and to changes in the causes alleged by the employers, as the perceived
relative cost of economic redundancies with respect to disciplinary layo?s may
have signi?cantly diminished. As for Labor Court activity, one would expect a
slowdown, as judges get adapted and learn the new set of rules, so that conges-
tion rates may have temporarily increased. Hence, besides the direct impact on
labor court rulings, the reforms gave rise to other e?ects by which the selection
of cases solved by Labor Courts may have changed and, thus, the proportion of
dismissals being ruled out as fair could be di?erent after the reforms for other
reasons than the practical implementation of the new de?nition of "fair" eco-
nomic redundancies. We try to clarify these channels by means of a theoretical
model in the next section.
3 The determinants of labor courts’ rulings on
?rings: A theoretical model
The model tries to resemble the most important features of EPL in Spain in
order to identify the main channels through which recent EPL reforms may
have altered Labor Court rulings on ?rings. Its main motivation is to help us
to gauge to what extent our data analysis can be conclusive on the impact of
the reforms on "e?ective" ?ring costs.
The main assumptions of the model are:
9We must note, however, that recognizing that the dismissal was "unfair" up-front is still
a common strategy in Spain in order to avoid potentially long and uncertain trials.
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1. Employers decide to dismiss a worker and the reason on which to justify
it. (S)he makes an o?er to the dismissed employee to settle the case before
going to the labor court. If the worker refuses the o?er, the case goes to
Labor Court and the judge settles the dispute.
2. There are two types of ?rings: those justi?ed by economic reasons- (?)
and those in which disciplinary motives are alleged as the cause of the
dismissal (?).
3. Dismissals can have a good "cause" (?) or not (??).
4. Judges may be "socially motivated" (?) -biased in favor of the dismissed
employee- or "neutral" (??). The proportion of "neutral" judges is given
by ??
5. In each case {?? ?} the labor court ruling can be "fair" (?), "unfair" (?),
or "null" (?).
6. Employers pay red tape costs which are higher for economic redundancies
than for disciplinary layo?s (? ? ? ? = {?? ?}, with ?? ? ??) Dismissed
employees do not pay any red tape costs.
7. Severance payments are:
-Redundancies: ?? (if the case is ruled "fair") and ?? (if ruled "unfair"
or "null").
-Dismissals: 0 (if the case is ruled "fair") and ?? (if ruled "unfair" or
"null").
8. To accommodate settlements out of the Labor Court, employers (?) and
dismissed employees (?) must have di?erent subjective probabilities about
the rulings.
The following Table gives the probabilities that the labor court rules in favour
of the employer (redundancy/dismissal is "fair") for each possible case, assigned
by both employers and dismissed employees (??? where ? = {?? ?}? ? = {???}).
Table 1. Probabilities of "fair" rulings, across causes and judges’ type
?? ?
? ? ??? ???e? e? ? 1
? ??? ???e? e? ? 1
?? ? ??? 0
? ??? ? ??? 0
We obviously assume that the probability of a dismissal to be ruled out as
"fair" is higher when there is a "good" cause ( ??? ? ?
?
? , for all ?? ?). To simplify
the notation, and without any relevant loss of generality, we also assume that
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"socially motivated" judges have the same "bias" for economic redundancies as
for disciplinary layo?s, and that, under no cause, they always rule a dismissal
"unfair". Since ? is the proportion of "neutral" judges, then
??? (? | ?) = ???? , where ? = ?+(1??)e? ? 1? and ??? (? |??) = ???? for ? = ?? ??
The following table give what the Firms Expects to Pay (??? ) and what
the Worker Expects to Get (???) if the case is settled by a Labor Court
ruling.
Table 2. Expected Payo?s if dismissals settled at labor court
??? ???
? ? ?????? + (1? ????)?? + ? ? ?????? + (1? ????)??
? (1? ????)?? + ?? (1? ????)??
?? ? ?????? + (1? ????)?? + ?? ?????? + (1? ????)??
? (1? ???? )?? + ?? (1? ????)??
The employer has the option to claim, as the cause of ?rings, either redun-
dancy or disciplinary reasons, regardless of the true cause (or the lack of it).
Thus,
• Economic redundancies with cause are initiated alleging economic reasons
if and only if ????(?? ? ?? ) ? ?????? ? ? ? ? ??. If that condition is not
satis?ed they are disguised as disciplinary layo?s.
• Economic redundancies without cause are always initiated alleging disci-
plinary reasons since ????(????? )??????? ? ????? (under the assumption
that ??? ? ??? ).
• Disciplinary layo?s with cause are always initiated alleging disciplinary
reasons since ????(?? ? ?? )? ?????? ? 0 ? ?? ? ?? (since ??? ? ???).
• Disciplinary layo?s without cause are always initiated alleging disciplinary
reasons since ????(?? ? ?? )? ?????? ? 0 ? ?? ? ?? (under the assumption
that ??? ? ??? ).
Since there is the possibility of a private settlement, not all dismissals go to
court, but only those for which ??? ? ????




? ? ?? ) ? ??
Hence, the smaller the bias (1??) from "socially-motivated" judges is, and
the larger the di?erences ?? ? ?? and ??? ? ??? are, the higher the likelihood of
economic redundancies going to court is.





• Dismissals without a cause (always initiated alleging disciplinary reasons)





Finally, we assume that employers and workers’ subjective probabilities on











? = {?? ?}).
In our data, we observe:
?(?) = ?(???? + ????) + ?(1? ?? ? ??)??
where ?? and ?? are, respectively, the weights of economic redundancies and
disciplinary layo?s with cause going to labor court (which are determined by
the incidence of each type of ?rings and the conditions about out-of-court set-
tlements above). However, what we would like to know is the impact of the
reforms on ?? (? | ?? ??) = ?? and, plausibly, on the bias on rulings of economic
redundancies due to "socially motivated" judges (1??).
As the previous equation makes it clear, there are several channels through
which a EPL reform may change the observed frequency of fair ?rings in Labor
Courts rulings:
• Changes in the proportion of "socially motivated" judges or in the bias
introduced by them in court rulings (? and 1??).
• Changes in the weights of economic redundancies and disciplinary dis-
missals being settled at courts.
• Changes in the likelihood of an economic redundancy (with cause) be
declared as "fair" (??).
• Changes in the likelihood of a disciplinary layo? (with cause) be declared
as "fair" (??).
As for di?erences in ?(?) across provinces, they can be due to:
• Di?erent proportion of "neutral" judges (?). We disregard di?erences in
{?? ??e?}? since we cannot think of reasons why these parameters may di?er
across provinces other than the judge’s type.
• Di?erent weight of economic redundancies due to the di?erent incidence
of "economic reasons" (??).
• Similarly, disciplinary dismissals with cause go to labor court whenever:
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• As for the incidence of disciplinary layo?s (??), we assume that they are
equal across provinces (after conditioning for unemployment and the sec-
toral composition of employment), as we have no reasons to expect em-
ployees to have di?erences in misconduct or adaptation to jobs’ tasks
across provinces, once that local labor market conditions and the sectoral
composition of ?rms e?ects are accounted for.
Thus, this model highlights the most important selection e?ect is the chang-
ing distribution of economic redundancies with good causes, disciplinary layo?s
with good causes, and economic redundancies disguised as disciplinary layo?s.
It is conceivable that EPL in 2010 and 2012 increased the ?rst type of ?rings.
Moreover, during the crisis unemployment increased very much, so that it is
also conceivable that the incidence of disciplinary layo?s with a good cause has
fallen ("fear-of-unemployment e?ect"). Finally, the incidence of economic re-
dundancies disguised as disciplinary layo?s ought to have decreased too, since
lower red tape costs for economic redundancies give employers less incentives
to disguise them as disciplinary layo?s. But these conjectures assumed that
the incidence of conciliation settlements is unchanged, which may not be the
case if subjective probabilities of employers and employees have changed di?er-
ently during the unemployment crisis and after the reforms. By specifying the
relationship between our variable of interest (the probability that a economic
redundancy is declared fair by the Labor Courts, ??? ) and the variable that we
can measure (the proportion of dismissal cases being declared fair by the Labor
Court, ?(?) ), the model suggests the set of co-variates to control for selection
e?ects, namely those related to the composition of dismissal by cause and to
some characteristics of the Labor Courts.
Under certain conditions, the model also yields some bounds on the e?ects of
EPL reforms on ??? (? | ?? ??) = ??? , whose increase was one of the main objective
of the reforms. For instance, let us assume that the proportion of "neutral"
judges and the bias of "socially motivated" judges do not change as a result of
EPL reforms (? and ? remain unchanged). Let us also assume that EPL reforms
did not introduce any signi?cant change in judges, employers, and employees
perceptions of disciplinary dismissals (so that ?? and ?? also remain unchanged).
Then,
??(?) = ?????? + (??? ? ???)(??? + ???) + ?(?? ? ??)???
Given that ? ? ?? ?? ? ??? that ??? + ??? ? 0? (the incentives to disguise
redundancies as disciplinary layo?s diminish after an EPL reform that widens
the de?nition of fair redundancies) ??? ? 0 (there are less disciplinary layo?s





Hence, since ? ? ? (which according to the information in the annex is
around 0.5) and assuming ?? is also around 0.4 (according to the aggregate
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information on reasons for entry into the unemployment bene?t system), the
wedge between ??? and ??(?) is at most a factor of 5.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Data
We use data on Labor Courts rulings at the provincial level (50, excluding Ceuta
and Melilla for which no speci?c judicial information is available) and the period
2004Q1-2014Q3. These data were provided by the Spanish General Council
of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, henceforth CGPJ) and
contain information on the total number of con?icts resolved by Labor Courts
and on the sign of the ruling, i.e. if they were resolved in favour of the plainti?
(the employee) or the defendant (the employer). The data considered in our
analysis belong exclusively to the ?rst instance of the labor jurisdiction and
refer to individual dismissals. Some other clari?cations regarding the use of
judicial data follow:
• The Spanish jurisdiction dealing with the labor disputes is the labor (“so-
cial”) jurisdiction (Orden de lo Social). Labor relations in Spain are reg-
ulated by the labor legislation, whose main piece is the Workers’ Statute.
Con?icts between employees and employers are resolved in the labor courts
(Juzgados de lo Social) which are regulated by the Labor Procedure Act
(Ley de Procedimiento Laboral) and, more generally, by the Organic Law
of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). The latter sets out
that labor related matters are exclusively assigned to the Labor Courts,
so that the labor jurisdiction is separated from other jurisdictions (civil,
criminal or administrative). This is one of the main di?erences with other
countries, as for example, Italy, where a civil judge may also resolve a la-
bor dispute. Spanish CGPJ data on Labor Courts thus di?ers from similar
databases of other countries because it distinguishes the jurisdictions.
• The Spanish judicial system is composed of several hierarchical levels but it
is considered a "one instance" one whereas appeals after the ?rst instance
are considered "extraordinary". Figure 1 shows how the legal case may
proceed after an employee disagrees with the dismissal and decides to go
to court. That is, the employee will claim against the employer before
the ?rst-instance labor court located in the town where she is employed.
Once the judge has ruled the case, one of the parties (the employee or
the employer) may appeal the ?rst-instance judge’s decision in the labor
chamber of the High Court of Justice of the corresponding Spanish region.
Finally, the latter decision of the High Court of Justice may be contested at
a national level at the labor Chamber of the Audiencia Nacional or, before,
the Fourth Chamber of the Supreme Court. As it was said, those appeals
are only possible in "extraordinary cases" ("suplicación" and "casación")
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and are solved after long periods of time (typically, around 3 years). Thus,
by restricting our analysis to the ?rst-instance labor court rulings we are
not excluding a signi?cant part of the information.
As the main variable for our analysis we compute the proportion of Labor
Court rulings declaring dismissals fair for each province and quarter in the
sample. We can also observe the presence of the di?erent types of judges serving
in the Spanish judicial system (i.e. if the judge was holding o?ce in the court
when solving the complaint against the speci?c dismissal, or, on the contrary,
if the judge was appointed temporarily as reserve or substitute for an absent
member of the bench or, ?nally if he was holding o?ce in another court and was
temporarily appointed to serve in the court for solving the speci?c dismissal).10
Using this information we construct two control variables: the proportion of
Labor Court rulings issued by a judge that was holding o?ce in the court, and
a rate of temporary posts in the courts (that is the sum of days, per quarter,
in which the acting judge was absent, either substituted or not by a temporary
judge).
Since EPL reforms are likely to increase the time needed (at least in the
short term) for Labor Courts to solve dismissal disputes, as judges may need to
become accustomed to the new set of rules, we also compute a measure of the
"congestion" of the judicial system, when solving dismissal con?icts. Following
García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) the congestion rate is de?ned as
the ratio between the sum of pending cases (measured at the beginning of the





In a congested system, like the Spanish one, the ratio is usually above 1.
We have also constructed a measure which captures the "general" workload
of the Spanish labor jurisdiction called "out-of-court conciliations ratio". It is
calculated as the ratio of the number of out-of-court conciliations ?nished with
agreement divided by the sum of those conciliations (with agreement) and the
total number of dismissal lawsuits. Among other e?ects, we would like to observe
the e?ects of EPL reforms on the success of those conciliations to reduce the
workload of the judicial system. With the disappearance of the "interim wages"
(if the dismissal was ?nally declared "unfair") the incentive of the parties to
agree at the out-of-court court conciliation may have changed.
Other control variables to be included in the empirical analysis refer to the
economic environment of each province. In particular, it seems important to
10While judges holding o?ce in a court are judges who have passed a public exam and belong
permanently to the judiciary, judges appointed temporarily do not belong to the Judicial power
(they are lawyers or jurists who are appointed temporarily by the CGPJ during a period of
a year). See Martín-Román et al. (2013) for further evidence on the e?ects implied by the
di?erent types of judges in the system.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1507
control for the local unemployment rate (in deviations with respect to the sam-
ple mean), sectoral composition (relative weights of agriculture, industry, con-
struction and services sectors), and the temporary employment rate (proportion
of employees under ?xed-term contracts out of the total number of employees),
since these three variables could be related to the incidence of economic dis-
missals relative to disciplinary layo?s.11 Finally, as for the impact of the EPL
reforms, we de?ne the following two variables:
??????1 =
½
0? if ? ? 2010?2




0? if ? ? 2012?1
1? if ? ? 2012?1
¾
and, in some speci?cations, we interact these two variables and the unemploy-
ment rate at each province (???????????1 and ???????????2) to measure to what
extent EPL reforms have also generated some changes in the statistical associ-
ation between Labor Court rulings and unemployment.
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics of the proportion of Labor Court
rulings that declare dismissals fair at the national level by year, while Table 2
(and Figure 2) provides the same statistics at the provincial level for the whole
period of analysis. At the aggregate level, around 27.5% of cases are declared
fair, although there are signi?cant di?erences across time and provinces. In
the mid-2000s the proportion of dismissal cases ruled as fair by Labour Courts
was around 30%, to start decreasing in 2008 and reached 25% in 2010, the
year of the ?rst change in the legal de?nition of "fair" economic redundancies;
then, it increased temporarily in 2011 to 27.5% to decrease again below 24%
in 2013 and 2014. As for provinces, there are also substantial variation: Álava,
Burgos, Palencia or Teruel seem to have a higher proportion of dismissals being
declared fair (more than 33%), while in Ávila, Alicante, Toledo, and Tenerife
this proportion is less than 20%.
4.2 Results
We start by measuring di?erences-in-di?erences of the proportion of Labor
Court rulings that declare dismissals "fair" using the following speci?cation:




where the subindexes ? and ? refer, respectively, to province (? : 1???50) and time
period (? : 2004?1? 2014?3), ?? are province ?xed e?ects, ??????1 (alterna-
tively, ??????2) represents the labor market reform as explained in the previ-
ous section and ????????? is a set of control variables. We estimate both a linear
11For computing these variables, we use data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey.
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speci?cation and odds-ratios [Bishop et al. (1975), Williamson et al. (1995)].12
These speci?cations are estimated by a within-group estimator. Clustered stan-
dard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are provided into
parentheses.13 We also report standard errors using bootstrapping techniques
(Efron, 1979), which are very similar to those computed under clustering.
Choosing the province as a unit of study would lead to misguiding results in
the case that dismissals initiated in a particular province were settled by Labor
Courts at another province. However, Spanish labor law strongly limits the
labor court where to settle the ?ring dispute to one of the province where the
employment services were provided, i.e., where the company is located, or of the
province where the employee has its main residence.14 Spanish provinces are
large enough so that in almost all the cases both places (company headquarters
and residence of the worker) are in the same province.15 As a summary, Table 3
provides the de?nition and data sources for all the variables used in our empirical
analysis and Table 4 displays their descriptive statistics.
Tables 5 to 12 report the estimation results. In each Table we present the re-
sults of eight di?erent speci?cations, including alternative set of co-variates (the
rate of temporary contracts, the sectoral composition of GDP in the province,
a group of controls for the characteristics of Labor Courts side, the congestion
rate when solving dismissal con?icts, and a control for the congestion of the
judicial system when solving speci?cally pre-trial conciliations). Finally, as an
alternative robustness check, we estimate the speci?cation with all co-variates,
excluding observations from Madrid and Barcelona.16
Overall, our reading of the results boils down to two main messages. First,
after taking into account that there is a negative statistical association between
the local unemployment rate and the proportion of dismissal cases being ruled as
"fair" by Labor Courts, the EPL reforms, specially the one taking place in 2010,
are associated with an increase of that proportion of about 2.5 percentage points;
while the e?ect of the 2012 EPL reform, not always statistically signi?cant,
seems to have been smaller, about 1.5 additional percentage points.17 Secondly,
12This latter transformation is based on the following expression for the dependent variable:
?????_?????????
1??????_?????????
13Clustering by provinces take into account the fact that our provincial data come from the
aggregation of the individual Labor Courts existing in each province, whose number varies
with the size of the province. It also takes into account the possibility of di?erent serial
correlation across provinces. As for the minimum number of clusters required, see Angrist
and Pischke (2009).
14Article 10 of the Labor Procedure Act (Ley de Procedimiento Laboral )
15According to the Labor Force Survey, workers commuting to a province other than their
province of residence amount to 4.6% during the period 2005-2013.
16Madrid and Barcelona are the most populated and economically active provinces of Spain.
Madrid holds the headquarters of the main instance labor tribunals. Both cities hold the head-
quarters of the main Spanish (and continental) Law ?rms (Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa,
2015).
17Notice, however, we have fewer observations to estimate the impact of the 2012 reform.
Introducing both reform dummies in the same regression do not qualitatively change the
results.
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the increase in the proportion of dismissal cases being declared as "fair" by Labor
Courts mostly arises from a less negative relationship between that rate and
local unemployment. In other words, given that local unemployment rates were
increasing after 2010, without the EPL reforms the proportion of the dismissal
cases being declared as "fair" would have been much lower.
As already explained, the changes in the probabilities of "fair" dismissals
observed in our data sets cannot be interpreted as the subsequent e?ect of the
widening of the legal de?nition of "fair" economic redundancies, since, among
other things, the selection of dismissal cases solved by Labor Courts may have
changed. For instance, if after the reforms employers were disguising more
economic redundancies as disciplinary layo?s and more of these dismissal cases
without cause are being solved by Labor Courts, the proportion of rulings declar-
ing dismissals "fair" could decrease even if the widening in the legal de?nition
of fair economic redundancies were being applied by the Labor Courts. Never-
theless, there are two pieces of evidence suggesting that this adverse selection of
cases did not occur. The ?rst one is that, at the national level, the proportion
of entrants into the unemployment insurance system after a objective dismissal
solved by a Labor Court has increased from less than 10% in 2007 to around
40% in 2014.18 Secondly, out-of-court conciliations have also increased after the
reforms.
The change in the frequency of out-of-court conciliations after the reform can
be seen in Tables 13 to 16. Using data from the register of the administrative
o?ce in charge of supervising these conciliations, we can compute the ratio of
dismissals solved by conciliation out of dismissals solved either by conciliation
and Labor Court rulings by year and province. Regressing this ratio on the same
sets of variables used in the regressions for fair dismissals rulings, we obtained
that the ratio increased after the 2010 reform and, also, after the 2012 reform. As
in the case of fair rulings, this ratio displays some negative statistics association
with the local unemployment rate and, also, the main reason of its rise after the
reform is a higher response to unemployment after the reforms. To what extent
this is the results of employers and dismissed employees’ expectation on Labor
Court rulings becoming more similar after the reforms needs to be investigated
with ?ner data. However, what this result indicates is that the selection of
dismissal cases being solved by Labor Courts after the reforms, if anything, tilted
towards more uncertain cases, probably those justi?ed on economic reasons since
these were the most a?ected by the reforms and, therefore, those for which
employers and employees had less information on how Labor Courts rulings
were going to be a?ected by the change in legislation.
As an indication that the change of legislation may have introduced more
uncertainty on Labor Court rulings on economic redundancies is that the con-
gestion of Labor Courts, as far as dismissals cases is concerned, also increased
18The composition of dismissals by economic redundancies and disciplinary layo?s at each
province can be obtained from the administrative data on entries into unemployment. Un-
fortunately, we have been unable to get the Public Employment O?ce to grant us access to
those data.
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after the reform (Tables 17 to 20) Again, we follow the same empirical strategy
as with rulings and conciliations and regress the congestion rate by quarter and
province on the same sets of variables used before. As it may be expected,
and as usual after any legislative reform, Labor Courts show an increased con-
gestion rate as a result of the arrival of the new legislation. In this case, the
reform of 2010 would have increased the congestion rate by 0.3-0.6 points on
average, while the 2012 reform would have increased the congestion rate by 0.7
points. In this case, there are no statistically signi?cant associations with the
local unemployment rate driving the changes.19
5 Conclusions
When the gap between ?ring costs of “fair” and “unfair” dismissals is large,
Labor Courts rulings on dismissal cases are critical for the determination of "ef-
fective" ?ring costs. According to the literature, labor judges often behave as
socially motivated agents. Moreover, EPL creates several areas for strategic be-
havior by employers and dismissed employees in the justi?cation and resolution
of disputes, such as the choice of the alleged dismissal cause by the employer and
agreements on out-of court and pre-trial conciliations. All these elements make
it di?cult to infer how EPL reforms may a?ect to the probability of economic
redundancies being declared fair by Labor Courts. In this paper, we provide a
theoretical model, tailored to the Spanish situation, to highlight several channels
by which changes in EPL legislation may be translated into changes in e?ective
?ring costs and investigate the impact of two recent EPL reforms widening and
making it more precise the de?nition of economic redundancies.
Using data on labor court rulings at Spanish provinces, and performing
di?erence-in-di?erence estimation of the probability of a dismissal being de-
clared fair, we ?nd that after the 2010 EPL reform there has been an increase
of about 2.5 percentage points in that probability. We have also provided some
scattered evidence showing that, if anything, the selection of dismissal cases
being solved by Labor Courts titled towards a higher weight of economic re-
dundancies. Hence, even taking into account that there is a gap between the
observed frequency of fair dismissal rulings by Labour Courts and the prob-
ability that an economic redundancy is declared "fair" we conclude that the
strategy of the Spanish EPL reforms of 2010 and 2012, focused on changing the
legal de?nition of fair economic redundancies, has not fully delivered a substan-
tial reduction of "e?ective" ?ring costs. This conclusion has three implications
for the policy debate on the need of introducing further labor market reforms.
One is that the reduction in non-wage labor cost implied by the extension of the
de?nition of economic redundancy has been minimal. Secondly and similarly,
the change of the indicators about the stringency of EPL for regular contracts
usually discussed in the debate (for instance the OECD indicators), insofar as
they are based on changes in legal ?ring costs and neglect the costs from Labor
19On the determinants of Labor Courts congestion and judges productivity, see Coviello,
Ichino, and Persico (2014, 2015).
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Courts’ intervention, overestimate the impact of the EPL reforms. Finally, since
the reduction of e?ective ?ring costs for economic redundancies under the regu-
lar employment contract has been minor, and given that the di?erence between
these ?ring costs and the termination costs of temporary contracts determines
the proportion of employees with ?xed-term contracts, the high incidence of
temporary employment observed in Spain would not be very much reduced by
these reforms.
6 Annex: Some information on the ideological
orientation of judges acting in the labor juris-
diction
Regarding the characteristics of the judges, the theoretical model distinguishes
between judges that are "socially motivated" -biased in favor of the worker- (?)
or "neutral" (??), being the former prone to interpreting EPL more favorably
to dismissed employees. The relative weight of these two categories of judges
is di?cult to measure empirically. Some approximation can be obtained by the
incidence of judges associations. While Spanish law prohibits a judge to join a
political party or a labor union while she is on active duty, it allows association
in professional groups, which happen to have some "ideological" orientations.
Currently, the major associations in Spain are the “Asociación Profesional de la
Magistratura” (APM), “Jueces para la Democracia” (JpD), “Asociación Fran-
cisco de Vitoria” (FV), “Foro Judicial Independiente” (FJI), and the “Aso-
ciación Nacional de Jueces” (ANJ). APM is perceived as conservative. JpD is
considered progressive and FV and FJI are considered "moderate".20
Unfortunately, information on the presence of the judicial associations at
the provincial level is not available. In this regard, we can only observe the
relative weight of judges of di?erent judicial associations at the fourth chamber
of the Supreme Court (that is, the Chamber that settles employment and social
security con?icts). This may be representative of the "ideological" orientation
of ?rst-instance labor courts for two reasons. First, the presence of the various
associations in the Supreme Court may be the direct consequence of the pres-
ence of those associations at lower levels. Secondly, Supreme Court’s decisions
(jurisprudence) are compulsorily followed by judges at lower levels for interpre-
tation of the Law, so that the survival of lower court decisions depends partially
on their consistency with the Supreme Court decisions. As shown in Figure
3, the relative weight of magistrates pertaining to progressive associations has
gradually increased at the expense of conservative and moderate associations
during last years. It is conceivable that this trend is associated with an increase
in the propensity to rule dismissal cases in a pro-employee fashion. In terms of
the theoretical model in the text, this corresponds to a decrease in the propor-
tion of "neutral" judges (?), and, hence, to a downward bias in our estimation of
the EPL reforms on the probability of a economic dismissal with "good" cause
to be ruled as fair.
20No presence of FJI was found in the Fourth Chamber of the Supreme Court in our period
of analysis.
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Figure 1: Layoff procedure in the Spanish labor jurisdiction
 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration 
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Figure 3: Memberships by association in the Supreme Court (fourth chamber) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the percentage of labor court judgments ruling that the dismissal 
was fair 
 
Year Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2004 200 0.2991 0.1102 0.0408 0.6667 
2005 200 0.3016 0.1096 0.0000 0.6923 
2006 200 0.3040 0.1026 0.0000 0.8333 
2007 200 0.2947 0.1058 0.0000 0.8000 
2008 200 0.2569 0.1009 0.0000 0.6667 
2009 200 0.2370 0.0892 0.0400 0.6000 
2010 200 0.2577 0.0946 0.0000 0.6667 
2011 200 0.2746 0.0790 0.0000 0.5000 
2012 200 0.2514 0.0926 0.0571 0.7500 
2013 200 0.2384 0.0838 0.0000 0.5714 
2014* 150 0.2357 0.0905 0.0000 0.6000 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data provided by the CGPJ 
Note: (*) 2014 include data available only until third quarter 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the percentage of labor court judgments ruling that the dismissal 
was fair (2004-2014*) 
 
Province Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A Coruña 43 0.2371 0.0434 0.1548 0.3264 
Albacete 43 0.2547 0.0700 0.1250 0.4762 
Alicante 43 0.1678 0.0328 0.1063 0.2306 
Almeria 43 0.2084 0.0523 0.1213 0.3300 
Alava 43 0.3429 0.0868 0.1905 0.5147 
Asturias 43 0.3180 0.0532 0.2024 0.4255 
Avila 43 0.1485 0.1389 0.0000 0.5714 
Badajoz 43 0.2936 0.0647 0.1575 0.4301 
Barcelona 43 0.2302 0.0384 0.1684 0.3256 
Bizkaia 43 0.2730 0.0484 0.1722 0.3581 
Burgos 43 0.3315 0.0818 0.2000 0.4857 
Caceres 43 0.3208 0.1184 0.1563 0.6667 
Cadiz 43 0.2746 0.0754 0.1197 0.4769 
Cantabria 43 0.2598 0.0515 0.1579 0.3670 
Castellon 43 0.2918 0.0661 0.1591 0.4267 
Ciudad Real 43 0.2750 0.0856 0.1389 0.4737 
Cordoba 43 0.3080 0.0644 0.1807 0.4857 
Cuenca 43 0.2998 0.1721 0.0649 0.8000 
Gipuzkoa 43 0.3070 0.0789 0.1667 0.4898 
Girona 43 0.2874 0.0722 0.1139 0.5000 
Granada 43 0.2599 0.0592 0.1346 0.3987 
Guadalajara 43 0.2327 0.1075 0.0728 0.5333 
Huelva 43 0.2352 0.0794 0.1033 0.4348 
Huesca 43 0.2805 0.1617 0.0000 0.5833 
Illes Balears 43 0.2432 0.0560 0.1392 0.3636 
Jaen 43 0.2964 0.0659 0.1515 0.4262 
La Rioja 43 0.2429 0.0856 0.0725 0.4364 
Las Palmas 43 0.2089 0.0381 0.1175 0.2857 
Leon 43 0.2431 0.0784 0.0917 0.4872 
Lleida 43 0.3251 0.1286 0.0667 0.6923 
Lugo 43 0.2815 0.1117 0.0408 0.5286 
Madrid 43 0.3022 0.0399 0.2344 0.3670 
Malaga 43 0.2696 0.0429 0.1636 0.3633 
Murcia 43 0.2649 0.0856 0.1330 0.4948 
Navarra 43 0.2814 0.0701 0.1200 0.4416 
Ourense 43 0.2266 0.0699 0.1000 0.3906 
Palencia 43 0.3751 0.1190 0.1000 0.6250 
Pontevedra 43 0.2779 0.0412 0.2010 0.3500 
Salamanca 43 0.2697 0.1086 0.1293 0.6341 
S.C. Tenerife 43 0.1899 0.0383 0.1228 0.2953 
Segovia 43 0.3066 0.1237 0.0000 0.6250 
Sevilla 43 0.2682 0.0504 0.1773 0.4514 
Soria 43 0.3003 0.1509 0.0000 0.6667 
Tarragona 43 0.3017 0.0650 0.1633 0.4479 
Teruel 43 0.3522 0.2172 0.0000 0.8333 
Toledo 43 0.1844 0.0661 0.0792 0.4679 
Valencia 43 0.2274 0.0387 0.1453 0.3202 
Valladolid 43 0.2879 0.0667 0.1316 0.4452 
Zamora 43 0.2676 0.1211 0.0545 0.5385 
Zaragoza 43 0.2193 0.0656 0.1016 0.3908 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data provided by the CGPJ 
Note: (*) 2014 include data available only until third quarter 
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Table 3: Description of variables 
 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SCALE/UNIT PERIOD SOURCE
Court rulings
Percentage of labour court judgments 
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Dummy 2004-2014 Self elaboration
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration 
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Court rulings 1800 27.5221 10.1403 0 83.3333
Reform 1 3600 0.1389 0.3459 0 1
Reform 2 3600 0.0417 0.1999 0 1
Interaction 1 3400 3.2223 8.2209 0 40.6261
Interaction 2 3400 1.0850 5.2769 0 40.6261
Unemployment rate 3400 14.6082 7.4209 2.1622 40.6261
Temporary employment rate 1800 0.2891 0.0984 0 0.5949
Share of services 3400 61.9545 8.0179 36.9500 88.5
Share of industry 3400 17.3584 6.7819 3.2000 37.72
Share of construction 3400 11.5821 3.1014 4.3000 23.8
Proportion of dismissal lawsuits analyzed (+) by 
professional judges over total
3600 0.8315 0.1465 0 1
Proportion of interim postings at the labor courts 1800 0.2738 0.6184 0 4.9444
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 3348 2.0017 0.71 0.8333 13







































2010 reform -0.0252*** 0.0265*** 0.0260*** 0.0256*** 0.0266*** 0.0362*** 0.0246** 0.0246**
(0.0069) (0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0108) (0.0112)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.436*** -0.363*** -0.386*** -0.346*** -0.421*** -0.424*** -0.416***
(0.0628) (0.074) (0.0928) (0.0904) (0.0916) (0.0946) (0.0955)
Temporary employment rate 0.133 0.142 0.118 0.162 0.166 0.17
(0.0937) (0.101) (0.101) (0.12) (0.12) (0.123)
Share of services 0.0156 0.00943 -0.0317 -0.0279 -0.0235
(0.145) (0.145) (0.163) (0.165) (0.165)
Share of industry 0.0872 0.0766 -0.00262 0.00711 -0.0105
(0.257) (0.26) (0.255) (0.256) (0.259)
Share of construction -0.0858 0.1020 0.0382 0.0363 0.0413
(0.212) (0.206) (0.203) (0.204) (0.206)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total -0.0149 -0.0225 -0.0219 -0.0212
(0.0171) (0.017) (0.0172) (0.0173)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0034
(0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0040)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0059 0.0061 0.0063
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0048)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0006* -0.0006*
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant 0.279*** 0.259*** 0.220*** 0.203 0.21 0.235 0.242 0.239
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0265) (0.1490) (0.1560) (0.1650) (0.1670) (0.1680)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.019 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.159 0.171 0.172 0.17
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 reform with bootstrap estimation -0.0252*** 0.0265*** 0.0260*** 0.0256*** 0.0266*** 0.0362*** 0.0246*** 0.0246***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 reform" (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0082)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION








































2012 reform -0.0338*** -0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0041 -0.0013 0.0101 0.0042 0.0044
(0.0084) (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0123) (0.012) (0.0125)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.288*** -0.203*** -0.285*** -0.251** -0.320*** -0.425*** -0.418***
(0.0571) (0.0696) (0.0996) (0.0955) (0.088) (0.0959) (0.0969)
Temporary employment rate 0.145 0.175* 0.146 0.196* 0.176 0.18
(0.0962) (0.0999) (0.0996) (0.117) (0.121) (0.124)
Share of services 0.0557 0.0502 0.033 -0.0195 -0.0152
(0.143) (0.142) (0.16) (0.165) (0.166)
Share of industry 0.0194 0.0087 -0.0736 0.0114 -0.006
(0.248) (0.251) (0.249) (0.257) (0.261)
Share of construction -0.196 -0.0028 -0.0725 0.0208 0.026
(0.202) (0.197) (0.2) (0.205) (0.206)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by 
professional judges over total -0.0133 -0.0205 -0.0201 -0.0194
(0.017) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0171)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor 
courts 0.0018 0.0028 0.0021 0.0037
(0.00239) (0.00278) (0.003) (0.00374)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0068 0.0063 0.0065
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0054)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0003) (0.003)
Constant 0.277*** 0.269*** 0.227*** 0.2 0.206 0.214 0.256 0.252
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0272) (0.145) (0.151) (0.16) (0.167) (0.168)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.026 0.054 0.055 0.057 0.153 0.159 0.171 0.169
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 reform with bootstrap estimation -0.0338*** -0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0041 -0.0013 0.0101 0.0042 0.0044
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 reform" (0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0099) (0.0095) (0.0102)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION








































2010 reform -0.0615*** 0.0492*** 0.0484** 0.0450** 0.0476** 0.0626*** 0.0501** 0.0505**
(0.0159) (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0188) (0.0224) (0.0229) (0.0238)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.934*** -0.811*** -0.881*** -0.804*** -0.965*** -0.959*** -0.952***
(0.153) (0.175) (0.226) (0.22) (0.218) (0.223) (0.227)
Temporary employment rate 0.224 0.309 0.274 0.379 0.385 0.39
(0.223) (0.244) (0.263) (0.329) (0.329) (0.341)
Share of services 0.3 0.285 0.262 0.276 0.284
(0.446) (0.435) (0.51) (0.515) (0.519)
Share of industry 0.386 0.368 0.265 0.275 0.249
(0.633) (0.616) (0.61) (0.616) (0.626)
Share of construction -0.0385 0.324 0.304 0.297 0.298
(0.465) (0.481) (0.532) (0.533) (0.536)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by 
professional judges over total
-0.0483 -0.0632 -0.0633 -0.0618
(0.0667) (0.0766) (0.0772) (0.0772)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor 
courts 0.0015 0.0042 0.0043 0.0073
(0.0056) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0098)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0233 0.0235 0.0241
(0.019) (0.0189) (0.0192)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial -0.0014* -0.0014*
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Constant 0.426*** 0.382*** 0.317*** 0.0381 0.0673 0.0265 0.0302 0.0254
(0.0063) (0.0072) (0.0634) (0.406) (0.405) (0.464) (0.467) (0.47)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.015 0.04 0.041 0.042 0.088 0.092 0.093 0.091
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 reform with bootstrap estimation -0.0615*** 0.0492*** 0.0484*** 0.0450*** 0.0476*** 0.0626*** 0.0501*** 0.0505***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 reform" (0.0119) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0176) (0.0168) (0.0172)
ODDS-RATIO MODEL








































2012 reform -0.0726*** 0.0086 0.0058 0.0012 0.0076 0.0297 0.02 0.021
(0.0188) (0.0219) (0.023) (0.0219) (0.0211) (0.038) (0.0371) (0.0384)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.695*** -0.560*** -0.730*** -0.667*** -0.818*** -0.982*** -0.976***
(0.142) (0.185) (0.257) (0.248) (0.234) (0.249) (0.254)
Temporary employment rate 0.234 0.352 0.306 0.432 0.399 0.405
(0.235) (0.247) (0.263) (0.326) (0.333) (0.345)
Share of services 0.367 0.354 0.377 0.298 0.307
(0.443) (0.431) (0.51) (0.52) (0.524)
Share of industry 0.274 0.254 0.145 0.284 0.259
(0.616) (0.6) (0.6) (0.619) (0.631)
Share of construction -0.204 0.169 0.119 0.267 0.268
(0.451) (0.473) (0.531) (0.535) (0.539)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by 
professional judges over total
-0.0463 -0.0606 -0.0605 -0.0589
(0.0664) (0.075) (0.0756) (0.076)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor 
courts 0.0024 0.0061 0.005 0.0085
(0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0091)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.024 0.0232 0.0237
(0.0211) (0.021) (0.0212)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0021*** -0.0021***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Constant 0.418*** 0.399*** 0.332*** 0.0342 0.0618 -0.0103 0.0552 0.0502
(0.00437) (0.00509) (0.0658) (0.402) (0.399) (0.458) (0.469) (0.473)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.016 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.085 0.088 0.092 0.091
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 reform with bootstrap estimation -0.0726*** 0.0086 0.0058 0.0012 0.0076 0.0297 0.02 0.021
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 reform" (0.0137) (0.01704) (0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0176) (0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0352)
ODDS-RATIO MODEL








































2010 interaction -0.0795 0.272*** 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.335*** 0.224** 0.235*** 0.230***
(0.078) (0.0887) (0.0869) (0.0924) (0.0815) (0.0842) (0.0838) (0.0857)
2010 reform -0.0066 -0.0212 -0.0192 -0.0207 -0.0329* -0.0049 -0.024 -0.0234
(0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0193) (0.0212) (0.019) (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0227)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.568*** -0.519*** -0.542*** -0.546*** -0.522*** -0.534*** -0.525***
(0.072) (0.0746) (0.0934) (0.0831) (0.086) (0.0892) (0.0907)
Temporary employment rate 0.0771 0.0889 0.0498 0.12 0.123 0.127
(0.0874) (0.0955) (0.0919) (0.114) (0.115) (0.118)
Share of services 0.0345 0.0332 -0.0131 -0.0098 -0.0060
(0.142) (0.141) (0.159) (0.16) (0.161)
Share of industry 0.0006 -0.0360 -0.0585 -0.0469 -0.0614
(0.261) (0.253) (0.245) (0.247) (0.25)
Share of construction -0.0403 0.1660 0.0790 0.0798 0.0829
(0.205) (0.194) (0.195) (0.196) (0.198)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total
-0.0175 -0.0239 -0.0229 -0.0218
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0168)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts 0.0031 0.0022 0.0023 0.0039
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0043)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0052 0.0054 0.0057
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0007** -0.0007**
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant 0.279*** 0.252*** 0.230*** 0.209 0.22 0.238 0.251 0.248
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0252) (0.147) (0.15) (0.158) (0.16) (0.161)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.171 0.176 0.177 0.175
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 interaction with bootstrap estimation -0.0795 0.272*** 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.335*** 0.224*** 0.235*** 0.230***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 interaction" (0.0613) (0.0661) (0.0690) (0.0787) (0.064) (0.0672) (0.0662) (0.0706)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION








































2012 interaction 0.0676 0.220* 0.210* 0.228* 0.279** 0.0244 0.0987 0.094
(0.12) (0.123) (0.122) (0.13) (0.116) (0.14) (0.143) (0.146)
2012 reform -0.0507 -0.0513 -0.0504 -0.0572 -0.0660* 0.0043 -0.0194 -0.0182
(0.0354) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0378) (0.0337) (0.0426) (0.0433) (0.0447)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.322*** -0.247*** -0.350*** -0.332*** -0.324*** -0.441*** -0.433***
(0.0571) (0.0631) (0.0928) (0.0864) (0.0868) (0.0952) (0.0963)
Temporary employment rate 0.126 0.158 0.126 0.195* 0.17 0.174
(0.0914) (0.0955) (0.0942) (0.115) (0.119) (0.122)
Share of services 0.0681 0.0651 0.0333 -0.0196 -0.0153
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.164) (0.165)
Share of industry -0.0573 -0.086 -0.0778 -0.0031 -0.0197
(0.257) (0.252) (0.252) (0.258) (0.262)
Share of construction -0.205 -0.0113 -0.0728 0.0225 0.0276
(0.201) (0.194) (0.2) (0.204) (0.205)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total -0.015 -0.0206 -0.0205 -0.0197
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.0173)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor 
courts
0.0028 0.0029 0.0023 0.0040
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0038)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0068 0.0062 0.0064
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0053)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0010*** -0.0010***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant 0.277*** 0.268*** 0.232*** 0.209 0.218 0.214 0.26 0.257
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0262) (0.144) (0.15) (0.159) (0.166) (0.167)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.026 0.059 0.06 0.062 0.16 0.159 0.171 0.169
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 interaction with bootstrap estimation 0.0676 0.220* 0.210* 0.228** 0.279*** 0.0244 0.0987 0.094
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 interaction" (0.0945) (0.0981) (0.0892) (0.1063) (0.0980) (0.1198) (0.1142) (0.1141)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION








































2010 interaction -0.154 0.607*** 0.590*** 0.604*** 0.753*** 0.502** 0.515** 0.510**
(0.17) (0.186) (0.173) (0.199) (0.197) (0.198) (0.197) (0.201)
2010 reform -0.0257 -0.0571 -0.0546 -0.0624 -0.0861* -0.0297 -0.0566 -0.0558
(0.0427) (0.0425) (0.0409) (0.0478) (0.0453) (0.0512) (0.0523) (0.0537)
Difference in unemployment rate -1.229*** -1.167*** -1.241*** -1.253*** -1.191*** -1.201*** -1.193***
(0.174) (0.16) (0.221) (0.223) (0.225) (0.232) (0.237)
Temporary employment rate 0.0974 0.185 0.12 0.283 0.29 0.296
(0.202) (0.221) (0.235) (0.312) (0.314) (0.327)
Share of services 0.344 0.338 0.304 0.316 0.323
(0.448) (0.437) (0.511) (0.515) (0.52)
Share of industry 0.185 0.115 0.139 0.157 0.137
(0.653) (0.617) (0.598) (0.606) (0.615)
Share of construction 0.067 0.466 0.396 0.393 0.391
(0.458) (0.467) (0.523) (0.525) (0.528)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional judges 
over total
-0.0541 -0.0664 -0.0654 -0.0633
(0.0653) (0.0755) (0.076) (0.076)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts 0.0045 0.0051 0.0052 0.0084
(0.0064) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0105)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0218 0.0221 0.0227
(0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0191)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0016** -0.0016**
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Constant 0.426*** 0.368*** 0.340*** 0.0527 0.0894 0.0346 0.0498 0.0455
(0.0063) (0.0076) (0.0593) (0.405) (0.4) (0.455) (0.457) (0.46)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.016 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.094
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 interaction with bootstrap estimation -0.154 0.607*** 0.590*** 0.604*** 0.753*** 0.502*** 0.515*** 0.510***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 interaction" (0.1347) (0.1385) (0.128) (0.1582) (0.174) (0.1571) (0.1603) (0.1689)
ODDS-RATIO MODEL








































2012 interaction 0.101 0.464* 0.449* 0.491* 0.595** -0.0167 0.103 0.0898
(0.269) (0.271) (0.262) (0.29) (0.269) (0.386) (0.388) (0.399)
2012 reform -0.098 -0.0993 -0.0979 -0.113 -0.130* 0.0336 -0.0047 -0.0006
(0.0795) (0.0806) (0.0799) (0.0855) (0.0777) (0.124) (0.125) (0.129)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.769*** -0.654*** -0.871*** -0.840*** -0.816*** -0.999*** -0.991***
(0.139) (0.159) (0.226) (0.221) (0.221) (0.233) (0.237)
Temporary employment rate 0.193 0.316 0.263 0.432 0.393 0.4
(0.22) (0.233) (0.248) (0.317) (0.324) (0.336)
Share of services 0.394 0.385 0.377 0.298 0.307
(0.441) (0.431) (0.509) (0.52) (0.524)
Share of industry 0.109 0.0525 0.148 0.268 0.246
(0.656) (0.625) (0.629) (0.641) (0.654)
Share of construction -0.225 0.151 0.119 0.269 0.27
(0.45) (0.468) (0.531) (0.536) (0.54)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total
-0.0499 -0.0605 -0.0609 -0.0592
(0.0666) (0.076) (0.0764) (0.0768)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor 
courts 0.0045 0.0061 0.0052 0.0087
(0.0055) (0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0093)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.024 0.0231 0.0236
(0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0209)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0021*** -0.0021***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Constant 0.418*** 0.397*** 0.342*** 0.0533 0.0875 -0.0109 0.0602 0.0547
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0622) (0.404) (0.401) (0.46) (0.471) (0.475)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.016 0.04 0.041 0.042 0.09 0.088 0.092 0.091
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 interaction with bootstrap estimation 0.101 0.464** 0.449** 0.491** 0.595** -0.0167 0.103 0.0898
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 interaction" (0.2077) (0.2110) (0.2019) (0.2338) (0.2377) (0.3268) (0.3076) (0.3295)
ODDS-RATIO MODEL









































2010 reform -0.0320* 0.0496** 0.0457** 0.0644*** 0.0629*** 0.0308* 0.0800*** 0.0796***
(0.017) (0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0175)
Difference in unemployment rate -0.706*** 0.0539 0.206 0.201 -0.0888 -0.051 -0.0306
(0.0965) (0.192) (0.174) (0.168) (0.178) (0.181) (0.184)
Temporary employment rate 1.344*** 1.096*** 1.082*** 0.872*** 0.860*** 0.887***
(0.218) (0.223) (0.228) (0.206) (0.203) (0.208)
Share of services -0.970*** -0.959*** -1.145*** -1.132*** -1.112***
(0.346) (0.345) (0.296) (0.292) (0.292)
Share of industry 0.132 0.146 0.316 0.275 0.228
(0.452) (0.447) (0.395) (0.394) (0.394)
Share of construction -0.435 -0.531 0.233 0.226 0.245
(0.53) (0.538) (0.457) (0.458) (0.46)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total 0.0493 0.0365 0.0317 0.0282
(0.0347) (0.023) (0.0229) (0.023)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts -0.0272*** -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0065
(0.0084) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0073)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0644*** 0.0637*** 0.0628***
(0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0117)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Constant 0.496*** 0.463*** 0.0772 0.807** 0.778** 0.699** 0.653** 0.626**
(0.006) (0.0072) (0.0622) (0.347) (0.342) (0.301) (0.3) (0.301)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.012 0.058 0.127 0.154 0.176 0.422 0.425 0.423
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 reform with bootstrap estimation -0.032** 0.0496*** 0.0457*** 0.0644*** 0.0629*** 0.0308** 0.0800*** 0.0796***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 reform" (0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0135)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION
Out-of-court conciliations ratio 








































2012 reform 0.0832*** 0.234*** 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.222*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.113***
(0.0176) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0137) (0.0128) (0.0129)
Difference in unemployment rate -1.270*** -0.617*** -0.335* -0.334* -0.234 -0.234 -0.209
(0.102) (0.182) (0.17) (0.17) (0.188) (0.193) (0.196)
Temporary employment rate 1.118*** 0.890*** 0.894*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.876***
(0.208) (0.208) (0.211) (0.206) (0.206) (0.21)
Share of services -0.841*** -0.838*** -1.059*** -1.057*** -1.039***
(0.308) (0.311) (0.28) (0.277) (0.278)
Share of industry 0.163 0.168 0.281 0.284 0.244
(0.386) (0.384) (0.375) (0.381) (0.381)
Share of construction -0.184 -0.279 0.19 0.19 0.205
(0.45) (0.461) (0.43) (0.431) (0.433)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by 
professional judges over total
0.0249 0.0302 0.0299 0.0282
(0.0263) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0215)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor 
courts -0.0111** -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0019
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0064)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0567*** 0.0567*** 0.0564***
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Constant 0.471*** 0.436*** 0.116* 0.730** 0.718** 0.680** 0.679** 0.650**
(0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0592) (0.303) (0.303) (0.284) (0.282) (0.284)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.052 0.283 0.331 0.354 0.363 0.457 0.457 0.452
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 reform with bootstrap estimation 0.0832*** 0.234*** 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.222*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.113***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 reform" (0.0140) (0.0087) (0.009) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0102)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION








































2010 interaction 0.550*** 1.356*** 1.169*** 1.098*** 1.031*** 0.692*** 0.666*** 0.666***
(0.144) (0.18) (0.191) (0.189) (0.184) (0.177) (0.176) (0.179)
2010 reform -0.158*** -0.192*** -0.162*** -0.134*** -0.123*** -0.0964** -0.0579 -0.0594
(0.0353) (0.0386) (0.0401) (0.0416) (0.0413) (0.0403) (0.0424) (0.0435)
Difference in unemployment rate -1.311*** -0.608*** -0.408** -0.374* -0.401** -0.363* -0.345*
(0.0922) (0.204) (0.196) (0.19) (0.192) (0.196) (0.2)
Temporary employment rate 1.095*** 0.871*** 0.874*** 0.740*** 0.737*** 0.763***
(0.217) (0.225) (0.229) (0.208) (0.206) (0.212)
Share of services -0.890** -0.885** -1.088*** -1.081*** -1.061***
(0.354) (0.354) (0.305) (0.302) (0.301)
Share of industry -0.22 -0.186 0.143 0.122 0.0808
(0.465) (0.463) (0.411) (0.409) (0.409)
Share of construction -0.238 -0.33 0.359 0.349 0.365
(0.517) (0.528) (0.438) (0.439) (0.44)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total
0.0404 0.0321 0.029 0.0263
(0.0306) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0211)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts -0.0232*** -0.003 -0.0031 -0.0051
(0.0077) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0069)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0623*** 0.0619*** 0.0610***
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Constant 0.496*** 0.435*** 0.124* 0.833** 0.807** 0.710** 0.678** 0.652**
(0.0063) (0.00661) (0.062) (0.35) (0.347) (0.308) (0.309) (0.31)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.032 0.146 0.191 0.207 0.222 0.441 0.442 0.44
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 interaction with bootstrap estimation 0.550*** 1.356*** 1.169*** 1.098*** 1.031*** 0.692*** 0.666*** 0.666***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 interaction" (0.1185) (0.1475) (0.1627) (0.1590) (0.1478) (0.1478) (0.1488) (0.1440)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION








































2012 interaction -0.12 0.500** 0.408** 0.287 0.248 0.0665 0.0703 0.103
(0.173) (0.187) (0.2) (0.21) (0.204) (0.24) (0.233) (0.235)
2012 reform 0.114** 0.115** 0.126** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.0999* 0.0986* 0.0879
(0.0515) (0.0493) (0.0511) (0.0542) (0.0529) (0.058) (0.0551) (0.0552)
Difference in unemployment rate -1.331*** -0.685*** -0.400** -0.391** -0.243 -0.245 -0.226
(0.112) (0.196) (0.186) (0.186) (0.197) (0.2) (0.204)
Temporary employment rate 1.086*** 0.871*** 0.877*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.870***
(0.211) (0.215) (0.218) (0.21) (0.211) (0.216)
Share of services -0.834*** -0.833*** -1.058*** -1.057*** -1.039***
(0.305) (0.308) (0.279) (0.277) (0.277)
Share of industry 0.0731 0.0901 0.27 0.274 0.229
(0.402) (0.4) (0.382) (0.387) (0.387)
Share of construction -0.194 -0.284 0.189 0.192 0.207
(0.452) (0.463) (0.43) (0.429) (0.432)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total
0.0235 0.0299 0.0297 0.0278
(0.0253) (0.021) (0.0208) (0.0212)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts -0.0102* -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0016
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0066)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits) 0.0567*** 0.0566*** 0.0563***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0114)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Constant 0.471*** 0.434*** 0.124** 0.746** 0.733** 0.682** 0.683** 0.655**
(0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0601) (0.305) (0.305) (0.286) (0.285) (0.286)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.052 0.292 0.337 0.357 0.365 0.457 0.457 0.453
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 interaction with bootstrap estimation -0.12 0.500*** 0.408** 0.287* 0.248 0.0665 0.0703 0.103
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 interaction" (0.1240) (0.1542) (0.1597) (0.1681) (0.1716) (0.1975) (0.1857) (0.1990)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION









































2010 reform 0.715*** 0.335*** 0.338*** 0.299*** 0.298*** 0.635*** 0.624***
(0.0806) (0.0523) (0.0521) (0.0503) (0.0514) (0.0957) (0.0991)
Difference in unemployment rate 2.351*** 1.777 0.878 0.768 0.993 1.017
(0.61) (1.08) (0.94) (0.972) (0.961) (0.973)
Temporary employment rate -0.977 -0.66 -0.465 -0.555 -0.616
(1.034) (1.109) (1.027) (1.017) (1.049)
Share of services 0.117 0.0321 0.087 0.0645
(1.28) (1.3) (1.294) (1.307)
Share of industry -0.608 -0.604 -0.884 -0.917
(1.588) (1.566) (1.587) (1.604)
Share of construction -3.04 -4.151* -4.159* -4.082*
(2.049) (2.144) (2.144) (2.157)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional 
judges over total -0.0178 -0.0478 -0.0786
(0.133) (0.13) (0.133)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts -0.0608 -0.0611 -0.105**
(0.0375) (0.0382) (0.0411)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) 0.0066 0.0064
(0.0051) (0.0051)
Constant 1.895*** 2.140*** 2.420*** 2.689** 2.828** 2.508* 2.573*
(0.012) (0.0193) (0.292) (1.327) (1.364) (1.331) (1.345)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,348 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.145 0.13 0.132 0.135 0.162 0.167 0.162
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 reform with bootstrap estimation 0.715*** 0.335*** 0.338*** 0.299*** 0.298*** 0.635*** 0.624***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 reform" (0.0611) (0.0389) (0.0403) (0.0369) (0.0390) (0.0704) (0.0702)




































MODEL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (excluding Madridand Barcelona)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
2012 reform 1.147*** 0.696*** 0.705*** 0.695*** 0.697*** 0.682*** 0.672***
(0.131) (0.0914) (0.0898) (0.0874) (0.0864) (0.0856) (0.0891)
Difference in unemployment rate 2.626*** 1.887* 0.346 0.195 -0.0911 -0.0531
(0.554) (1.012) (0.867) (0.914) (0.914) (0.925)
Temporary employment rate -1.255 -0.702 -0.501 -0.558 -0.601
(1.011) (1.078) (0.999) (0.994) (1.028)
Share of services 0.813 0.719 0.563 0.531
(1.376) (1.388) (1.33) (1.34)
Share of industry -0.989 -0.99 -0.772 -0.766
(1.578) (1.547) (1.586) (1.603)
Share of construction -3.444* -4.557** -4.301* -4.254*
(2.045) (2.115) (2.207) (2.219)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by 
professional judges over total
-0.0472 -0.0446 -0.0659
(0.124) (0.123) (0.127)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor 
courts -0.0403 -0.0421 -0.0728*
(0.0332) (0.0326) (0.0385)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.001 -0.0009
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Constant 1.950*** 2.180*** 2.539*** 2.372* 2.534* 2.648* 2.696*
(0.0059) (0.0107) (0.286) (1.375) (1.415) (1.367) (1.383)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,348 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.126 0.161 0.163 0.17 0.197 0.198 0.192
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 reform with bootstrap estimation 1.147*** 0.696*** 0.705*** 0.695*** 0.697*** 0.682*** 0.672***
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 reform" (0.1131) (0.0733) (0.0660) (0.0687) (0.0656) (0.0630) (0.0670)









































2010 interaction 3.006** 2.048 2.307* 2.341* 2.036* 1.81 1.872
(1.203) (1.237) (1.279) (1.318) (1.204) (1.187) (1.198)
2010 reform -0.0771 -0.0399 -0.0838 -0.134 -0.0786 0.257 0.23
(0.251) (0.252) (0.26) (0.268) (0.247) (0.243) (0.246)
Difference in unemployment rate 1.653*** 0.723 -0.181 -0.156 0.139 0.128
(0.57) (1.121) (1.099) (1.102) (1.089) (1.11)
Temporary employment rate -1.433 -1.102 -0.85 -0.887 -0.962
(1.068) (1.195) (1.09) (1.082) (1.114)
Share of services 0.31 0.201 0.227 0.207
(1.164) (1.207) (1.212) (1.225)
Share of industry -1.19 -1.109 -1.297 -1.327
(1.7) (1.665) (1.677) (1.688)
Share of construction -2.624 -3.754* -3.803* -3.722*
(1.951) (2.034) (2.044) (2.059)
% of dismissal lawsuits analized (+) by professional judges 
over total -0.0305 -0.055 -0.0837
(0.128) (0.126) (0.129)
Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts -0.0568 -0.0575 -0.100**
(0.0372) (0.0379) (0.0416)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) 0.006 0.0058
(0.0049) (0.0049)
Constant 2.030*** 2.107*** 2.514*** 2.701** 2.844** 2.565* 2.633*
(0.0216) (0.0187) (0.297) (1.272) (1.329) (1.318) (1.333)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.13 0.136 0.139 0.142 0.167 0.171 0.167
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2010 interaction with bootstrap estimation 3.006** 2.048* 2.307* 2.341* 2.036** 1.81* 1.872*
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2010 interaction" (1.2841) (1.1481) (1.1919) (1.2655) (1.0399) (1.0806) (0.999)









































2012 interaction 2.251 1.074 1.227 1.483 1.223 1.435 1.549
(1.744) (1.708) (1.73) (1.77) (1.666) (1.637) (1.66)
2012 reform 0.436 0.44 0.413 0.342 0.406 0.338 0.298
(0.434) (0.434) (0.439) (0.448) (0.421) (0.413) (0.423)
Difference in unemployment rate 2.561*** 1.771* 0.158 0.0357 -0.323 -0.303
(0.539) (1.006) (0.901) (0.949) (0.936) (0.952)
Temporary employment rate -1.326 -0.78 -0.566 -0.642 -0.69
(1.018) (1.101) (1.017) (1.012) (1.045)
Share of services 0.835 0.737 0.56 0.527
(1.362) (1.375) (1.325) (1.335)
Share of industry -1.241 -1.199 -0.982 -0.991
(1.737) (1.686) (1.699) (1.716)
Share of construction -3.463* -4.563** -4.269* -4.219*
(2.055) (2.125) (2.2) (2.213)




Proportion of temporary postings at the labor courts -0.0373 -0.0388 -0.0683*
(0.0335) (0.0328) (0.0391)
Judicial congestion rate (pre-trial conciliations) -0.0013 -0.0011
(0.0034) (0.0034)
Constant 2.109*** 2.178*** 2.558*** 2.420* 2.576* 2.715* 2.768*
(0.0103) (0.01) (0.288) (1.403) (1.438) (1.393) (1.407)
Provincial fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,728
R-squared 0.13 0.162 0.164 0.171 0.198 0.199 0.193
Clusters (provinces) 50 50 50 50 50 50 48
2012 interaction with bootstrap estimation 2.251 1.074 1.227 1.483 1.223 1.435 1.549
Bootstrap (standard errors) for "2012 interaction" (1.5755) (1.4758) (1.438) (1.535) (1.373) (1.311) (1.3938)
Judicial congestion rate (dismissals lawsuits)
OLS LINEAR REGRESSION
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